Abstract In twentieth-century continental philosophy, German philosophical anthropology (Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen) can be seen as a sort of conceptual laboratory devoted to human/animal research, and, in particular, to the discontinuity between human and non-human animals. Its main notion-the idea of the special position of humans in nature-is one of the first philosophical attempts to think of the specificity of humans as a natural and qualitative difference from non-human animals. This school of thought correctly rejects both the metaphysical and/or religious characterisations of humans, and the positivistic gradualism, that sees the human being as an animal endowed with a greater degree of certain faculties (intelligence, etc.). At the same time, German philosophical anthropology still takes it for granted that such natural-qualitative novelty is unique in the realm of the living, that in correspondence with humans there is the hiatus, the discontinuity par excellence. The semiotic side of this view is the distinction between signs and symbols developed by Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer: animal signs would be mere proxies for perceptive elements or stimuli, whereas only human symbols could convey complex representation of objects and situations. The goal of this contribution is to criticise the alleged uniqueness of the hiatus and its semiotic implications through the opposite approach of the diffuse discontinuities. This approach that focuses on the semiotic traits of different species-specific environments (Umwelten) can be traced back to Jakob von Uexküll's biosemiotical phenomenology, which thinks of discontinuities as a normal phenomenon of animal life.
Introduction
German philosophical anthropology of the twentieth century includes three main thinkers (Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen) , as well as two other philosophers (Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer) who, at least partially, can be associated with this branch of continental philosophy. Many scholars take the chronological starting point for this current to be the year 1928, when Max Scheler's The Human Place in the Cosmos was published (Scheler 2009 ); as to its end, there is less unanimity, but, personally, I see it as coinciding with the year 1982, i.e., with the publication of the third volume of the anthropological-philosophical work of Susanne Langer Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (Langer 1982) .
It is not easy to present the theoretical background of German philosophical anthropology in such a way as to give an account of its complexity. The best way is perhaps to begin with the concept of the special position (Sonderstellung) of humans, that is to be found, in various ways, in the anthropological views of all authors belonging to the current. In a philosophical-anthropological perspective, such a concept has a twofold function. On the one hand, it is intended to oppose the positivism of the nineteenth-century and, in particular, the idea that the difference between human and non-human animals should be traced back to a mere difference of degree in the possession of some faculties (a lower degree of 'instinct', coupled with a greater degree of 'intelligence', 'imagination', 'communication skills ', etc.) .
On the other hand, German philosophical anthropology does not want to return to the prevailingly metaphysical and idealistic tradition of Western philosophy. In this tradition, often latently based on a religious worldview or explicitly intertwined with it, the specificity of humans lies either in their being the image of God, or in the possession (equally tied to the creatural status) of an instance that is ontologically separated from corporeality and endowed with a high capacity of unifying the sphere of experience. This hegemonic, privileged ontological element can take on different forms: the soul, or spirit, in the Platonic-Christian tradition, the Cartesian, Kantian or Neo-Kantian 'I think', or 'pure reason', and finally, the Hegelian spirit.
In German philosophical anthropology, notably in Plessner and Gehlen, the will to break with the metaphysical aspects of much continental philosophy (and, in particular, of the German idealistic tradition) is very strong. Consequently, this school of thought regards the difference between human beings and non-human animals not only as a qualitative one (thus rejecting the idea of a mere difference in degree), but also as neither metaphysical, nor as identical with a unique, hegemonic faculty. The difference consists, instead, of a human-specific, but natural relationship with life and action context, which influences all aspects of human life and whose description requires new categories. For German philosophical anthropology, putting the focus on this relationship is also the only way to overcome the severe state of fragmentation of contemporary human studies, divided as they are in philosophy, psychoanalysis, ethnology, sociology, history, cultural anthropology, etc.
This basic intuition-the idea that the specificity of humans is to be found in the qualitative difference of his relationship with the life sphere-is developed in different ways by the authors belonging to the current. In Scheler's work it takes the name of Weltoffenheit, or 'world-openness' (Scheler 2009, 28) , in Plessner's one that of Exzentrizität, or the 'ex-centrical form' (Plessner 1975, 288-296, 291, 309, 341-345; Asemissen 1991) , in Gehlen's thought it takes that of the 'special place' (Sonderstellung) of humans (Gehlen 1988, 5) . For reasons of time and consistency, I will not dwell on the specific claims of every author and I will focus instead on two common elements. The first is the idea that the qualitative novelty of human beings is a 'hiatus' separating them from non-human animals, from which culture arises. Here I will refer in particular to Arnold Gehlen-, first, to explain how he employs the term 'hiatus' in its anthropological theory, and, second, to evaluate the possibility of making extensive use of the notion, taking it as a critical category capable of grasping an entire 'family' of conceptions of the human-animal relationship. The second element is the idea that such hiatus includes a difference in the semiotic organisation of human and animal cognition, a difference that is centred on the respective usage of signs and symbols (this issue will be dealt with based on Gehlen, Ernst Cassirer, and Susanne Langer). As we shall see, the second element can be seen as the semiotic side of the first; in other words, here the idea of the Sonderstellung intertwines directly with semiotic and zoosemiotic issues.
In the Concluding remarks, in addition to the undeniable merits of philosophical anthropology, I will also highlight some weak points of its approach. In particular, one of them: its view of animal life, that constitutes a sort of undiscussed precondition of the hiatus thesis. In order to do that, I will analyse the reading and the usage that the authors of German philosophical anthropology make of Jakob von Uexküll's concept of Umwelt. This is, in my opinion, one of the best possible ways to preserve the advantages of this current (and, primarily, its contribution to the de-metaphysicalisation of continental philosophy): to embed it in a more appropriate theory of semiotic discontinuities.
The Hiatus Model in German Philosophical Anthropology
In Arnold Gehlen's philosophical anthropology, the peculiar position of humans is frequently defined as a hiatus, or, with a term that sounds quite old-fashioned to contemporary ears, as an essential difference (Wesensunterschied). BHuman actions^-writes Gehlen-Bare concerned with objective situations and are carried out independently of needs; this creates a 'hiatus' wherein lies the key of the problem of the 'soul'^ (Gehlen 1988: 140) . Here the term 'soul', which was old-fashioned for Gehlen himself, is placed between quotation marks, with a slightly polemical intention: what has to be explained is that natural/qualitative novelty, that was once called 'soul' (and for which Gehlen prefers concepts such as the 'cultural' or 'institutional nature' of humans). In other places, the term 'hiatus' is used to indicate the peculiarity of the human pulsional system: that all human impulses, even organic ones, can be inhibited is of tremendous importance […] The deferral of gratification […] creates a void, a hiatus, between the needs and their gratification; action lies in this 'void', as does thought. We might describe the hiatus as the reality of completed experience [vollzogene Erlebniswirklichkeit] . (Gehlen 1988: 329) In short, the hiatus is the gap that breaks the cause-effect chain between needs and drives on the one side, and human overt action on the other; it has, therefore, an inhibiting influence. At the same time, it founds the independence of human cognition and action from the immediate perceptive situations; according to Gehlen, this leads to an 'objective' and more complete experience and, furthermore, to rituals, institutions, culturally stabilised action, etc.
To sustain this view, Gehlen sketches a picture of animal cognition and behaviour that can furnish a background against which the Sonderstellung of human beings emerges as clearly as possible. In the programmatic chapter BLimits to animals' achievements^, non-human animals (and even higher animals, such as apes) are described as subjected to heavy and unavoidable behavioural and cognitive limits: their operative capabilities would always depend on visual cues (they would, for instance, encounter many problems if they have to combine the usage of two objects, one of which is no longer present in their visual field); their learning capacity would not be spontaneous, but be compelled by Bthe presence of a strong, instinctive stimulus ( Gehlen 1988: 138) ; they would be unable Bto understand, indeed even to perceive, a thing as itself^ (Gehlen 1988: 141) and to grasp Bthe wealth of objective properties of things^ (Gehlen 1988: 141) ; finally, they would perceive, instead of 'one thing', only a perceptive stimulus or series of stimuli, leaving the whole of the object undetermined.
Gehlen's account is based on a research line on animal behaviour that, at his time, was widely discussed (even thanks to the resonance of the Gestaltpsychologie). This line is well exemplified by the study of Hans Volkelt (1886 Volkelt ( -1964 on representations in animals (Volkelt 1914) . Leaning on Felix Kruger (1874-1948), Volkelt not only supports the idea of the absence of thing-like perceptions in animals' perceptive experience, but suggests an alternative theory: non-human animals would not direct their actions according to the varying properties of well-defined, thing-like nuclei, but reacting to the appearance, modification and disappearance of 'global qualities' (Komplexqualitäten; see Volkelt 1914: 90) , i.e., perceptive 'moods' pervading the whole perceptive situation. In other words, animal perception would be holistic and not organised in substantial nuclei, in substrata bearing the change of perceptive qualities; even slight modifications in the Komplexqualität would be enough to guide the animals' behaviour, without any inner reference to 'things' or 'causes'.
A second reference point of Gehlen's hiatus theory is Wolfgang Köhler's experiments on apes, of which he gives a very reductive interpretation. Gehlen reads the account of Köhler's tests on chimpanzees constantly looking for the confirmation of his thesis that all animal behaviour is dependent on the instinctual and perceptive situation of the animal. Apes, writes Gehlen, Black the structure […] of independent action^; when they explore the environment searching for something that can help them in solving a problem, they are Bnot able to make their searching independent; they have no objective image of what they are searching for^, because they lack Ban objective view of the situation, relieved from immediate needs^ (Gehlen 1988: 138) . Without going into this in more depth, it is enough here to highlight that Gehlen's reading does not correctly render the approach of Köhler, who, moving from the Gestaltheorie, tries to identify, on the observation level, the sense of a behavioural schema, even if the final result is a failure (see Köhler 1925; Hartung and Wunsch 2016: 264-266) . With slight differences, the same limiting view of animal action-and, relevantly, the same reductive interpretation of Köhler's tests-are shared by all mentioned authors of German philosophical anthropology. In Plessner, for instance, the dividing line between nonhuman animals (and, again, even apes) and humans is traced in correspondence of the alleged incapacity of animals to grasp the 'negative elements' of perceived situations, i.e., to include, in a consequent manner, presently not-actual components in the momentary perception (they Black the sense of the negative^ ; Plessner 1975: 270) . In other words, they were able, for example, to combine present elements of a given situation, but not to conceive what exactly is missing in it, that would help them to solve a given problem (Plessner 1975: 269-270) .
Summarising German philosophical anthropology gives a rather reductive view of the possibilities of animal action. The latter is seen as heavily dependent from perception; perception (in turn) is traditionally thought of as a collection of sensory stimuli triggering instinctive movements. Moreover, even higher animals are seen as incapable of performing even the simplest abstractive operation: a) they were not able to form the concept of a stable substrate behind the stimuli (the 'thing'), and b) they would lack the sense for the negative and, therefore, they could not conceive what is missing, or not perceptually given, in a given situation. These are, especially for Gehlen, the basic traits of the background against which the qualitative novelty of humans should stand out.
The Semiotic Side of the Hiatus Model: the Difference between Signs and Symbols
In addition to this action-related, cognitive side, the hiatus that German philosophical anthropology traces between animals and humans has also a semiotic side. All mentioned authors, and in particular Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer (who was a student of the former), propose a sharp distinction between signs and symbols and ascribe to animals the usage of signs, to human beings the so-called symbolic mentality (Langer 1954: 21) . Signs-a term which, for both thinkers, is often synonymous for signals-are seen as substitutes (proxies) of real objects; more precisely, they are seen as the proxies of the stimuli that have been described above as the starting point of animal action. Animal life is seen as based on simple reactions to stimuli, and the insertion of signs does not change the framework: animals would react to signs in the same way they would react to the real object or event they stand for (or better, for the stimuli coming from them). Signs, writes Langer, Bact as proxy for their objects and evoke conduct appropriate to the latter instead of to themselves^ (Langer 1954: 48) . The interpretation of signs is the most elementary and most tangible sort of intellection; the kind of knowledge that we share with animals, […] that has obvious biological uses, and equally obvious criteria of truth and falsehood. Its mechanism may be conceived as an elaboration of the conditioned-reflex arc. (Langer 1954: 48) Even in Cassirer's thought, the use of signs and signals does not break the (alleged) basic immediacy of animal reactions: they are Bpart of the physical world of being^and have Ba sort of physical or substantial being^ (Cassirer 1944: 51) . By contrast, symbols disclose the immaterial dimension of meaning and abstract thinking. They are not proxy for their objects, but are vehicles for the conception of objects. To conceive a thing or a situation is not the same thing as to 'react toward it' overtly, or to be aware of its presence. In talking about things we have conceptions of them, not the things themselves; and it is the conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly 'mean.' Behavior toward conceptions is what words normally evoke; this is the typical process of thinking. (Langer 1954: 49) It is remarkable, here, that the same item Bmay serve in either capacity^ (Langer 1954: 49) : that little noise, or that arrangement of ink stains, that we call a 'word' can be both a sign and a symbol (taking these terms only in the sense that Cassirer and Langer give them; in other semiotic theories, such as in Peirce, the use of these concepts is very different (Peirce 1965: 172-173) ). Just think of the different mental processes taking place when we react to the street sign STOP written on the asphalt, or we grasp the meaning of the verb 'to stop'. Frequently, the same item can be either a sign, or a symbol for different subjects: to humans, a person's name vehicles a conception of the person; for a dog, the name of the master would be only a call-name, a signal of his presence, or possible presence.
1 So writes Langer:
If you say 'James' to a dog whose master bears that name, the dog will interpret the sound as a sign, and look for James. Say it to a person who knows someone called thus, and he will ask: 'What about James?'. That simple question is forever beyond the dog; signification is the only meaning a name can have for him. (Langer 1954: 50) This description of the semiotic abilities of animals is as reductive as the above sketched view on their behavioural capacity. The usage of signs, indeed, implies no real change in the perceptive and operative repertoire of animals, nor does it break the (alleged) immediate link between stimulus and reaction. Only in humans, writes Cassirer, do we find Bbetween the receptor system and the effector system […] a third link […] which we may describe as the symbolic system^ (Cassirer 1944: 43) . Language, art, myths, religions, and even science are rooted in this breaking of animal immediacy: if in animals Ba direct and immediate answer is given to an outward stimulus^, in humans Bthe answer is delayed, […] interrupted and retarded by a slow and complicated process of thought^ (Cassirer 1944: 43) . As a consequence of the Binterposition of this artificial medium^, humans do not live Baccording to his immediate needs or desires. He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, of hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusions, in his fantasies and dreams^ (Cassirer 1944: 43) .
excitations'B (Cassirer 1996: 61) that can be replaced by signs, thanks to language (and, in particular, to substantives) a variety of perceptive traits can Bcondense into a firm, thing-like [dinghaft] 'nucleus'^ (Cassirer 1996: 61) . And this is possible, again, only for humans: animals are left, so to speak, at the margins of the semiotic field.
Two Strategies of Criticism towards the Hiatus Theories
In short, the cognitive, behavioural and semiotic aspects of the vision of animal life supported by the German philosophical anthropology of the twentieth century converge in limiting, in a heavily biased way, the abilities of non-human animals. Non-human animals can only perceive stimulation, and not conceive things; they can only act in response to immediate needs, and cannot postpone their action or take position in front of their needs; finally, they can only use signs or signals as proxies of thing, or better, as proxies of the stimuli carried by those entities that we humans can see as things. The latter view, which we have defined as the semiotic side of the idea of Sonderstellung, can be criticised from many sides. It lacks, for instance, Peirce's more articulated distinction of symbols, icons and indexes (Peirce 1965: 156-173 ) and neglects useful notions, such as those of connotation and denotation (Frege 1892) , that had already been developed by the philosophy of language. Nevertheless, or maybe precisely because of its immediacy, the sign/symbol distinction is still seductive today. But, in addition to these specifically semiotic and logical criticisms, the hiatus model can be questioned, in a more radical way, by criticising the view of the human/animal relationship on which it is based. In this concluding section, our goal is to differentiate two chief strategies through which this can be done.
Apes Breaking the World of Signs
The first strategy aims at identifying, in the behavioural and cognitive repertoire of animals (and, particularly, of primates), relevant cases of 'symbolic mentality'. In other words, this strategy looks for (sometimes even fragile) cognitive bridges overcoming the hiatus already in the animal world, but without questioning the general validity of the model. Such bridges are looked for, in particular, inside the social behaviour of apes: phenomena of deception, pretence, and pretend play can be studied only by moving from the assumption that apes can overcome the mere perceptive level-that they can, for instance, imagine the probable reaction of the conspecific that has to be deceived, her/his point of view, etc. According to many researchers (de Waal 1992; Gómez and Martín-Andrade 2002) , these behaviours require symbolic and/or representative tools, even if not of a linguistic kind. Even if we wanted to stick to the extreme of Langer's idea that animal signs are nothing but proxies of perceptive elements, we should nevertheless admit that, in this phenomena, to be replaced by proxies are neither isolated stimuli nor isolated objects, but whole social situations, whose elements are recombined in alternative ways in the subject's mind ('if I do this, he will react this way…'). This strategy keeps the distinction between signs and symbols alive, but seeks clues of symbolic mentality already in the animal behavioural repertoire. In other words, it does not abolish the threshold between semiotic and nonsemiotic animal experience, but tries to move it down, including in the semiotic area even higher animals-or, at least, some higher animals: apes, domesticated animals, dolphins, social birds, etc. (for an evaluation of the concept of semiotic threshold and its contemporary usage, see Nöth and Kull 2001; Higuera and Kull 2017) .
Curiously enough, the first crack in the assumption that all animal behaviour is based on the mere usage of signs is already to be found inside a branch of German philosophical anthropology, and, precisely, in its less typical representative, Susanne Langer. In the second volume of Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, Langer gives both a theoretical description of this Bfirst break with the world of pure signs^ (Langer 1954: 89) , and an example of it. As for the first, the philosopher warns researchers not to look for articulate and complex forms of language:
What we should look for is the first indication of symbolic behavior, which is not likely to be anything as specialised, conscious, or rational as the use of semantic […] . The earliest manifestation of any symbol-making tendency, therefore, is likely to be a mere sense of significance attached to certain objects, certain forms or sounds, a vague emotional arrest of the mind by something that is neither dangerous nor useful in reality. The beginnings of symbolic transformation in the cortex must be elusive and disturbing experiences, perhaps thrilling, but very useless, and hard on the whole nervous system […] . It is like a dawn of superstition-a forerunner of fetishes and demons, perhaps. (Langer 1954: 89) As for the example, Langer discusses the experiences gained with chimpanzees by Robert Yerkes (1876 -1956 ), Winthrop Kellogg (1898 -1972 , and Köhler. In Langer's account, according to these researchers chimpanzees would show on many occasions irrational fear, or irrational delight, for objects that are perhaps curious but totally innocuous, or, better, Bthat have no biological significance^ (Langer 1954: 92) for them: a stone, a pair of blue trousers, etc. In describing such behaviours, all mentioned authors cannot avoid the impression that these objects Bseem to convey something ( Langer 1954: 92) to a particular ape and that this 'something' is neither a mere perceptive element, nor a proxy of the latter.
With the progress of primatological research, the break in the (alleged) realm of pure signs did nothing but widen. The next generation of primatologists, and in particular Ann Premack (1929-) and David Premack (1925 replaced the naive project of teaching apes to talk (apes, indeed, lack an adequate laryngeal apparatus) with the more realistic idea of teaching them the American Sign Language (Premack and Premack 2003; Jenswold 2014; Gardner and Gardner 1980) . From this moment onwards, in the literature on apes' cognitive abilities a new issue emerges: the question of the modifications that the symbolic or linguistic training induce in the cognitive sphere of the learning ape. One of the most-known experiments is reported by Thompson and Oden. It consists of placing a chimpanzee in front of a set of geometrical figures including several pairs of shapes; some pairs are formed by two identical figures, others by two different figures. The identification of two identical elements (two circles, two squares) does not pose any problems even to untrained chimpanzees (this cognitive process takes place, actually, on the perceptive level). On the contrary, apes meet difficulties if they are asked to sort out pairs of different figures (for example, a circle-triangle couple, or a square-hexagon one). The second task, indeed, requires the ability to identify symbolically an abstract relational property of the objects, that of Bdifferent from^, and to grasp the various ways in which this relationship may intervene in the perceptive situation. But, after having learned a simple sign language including the signs for 'equal' and 'different' in the American Sign Language, the chimpanzee also succeeds in solving the second part of the test (Thompson and Oden 1993; Cimatti 1999 Cimatti , 2001 .
Further promising research, that seems to indicate the beginning of symbolic mentality in apes, is based on phenomena such as pretence, pretend play, dissimulation, deception, and the like. These modalities of behaviour seem to require the availability of mental representations of elements that are not present on the perceptive level. In their accurate discussion of pretend play among gorillas, Gómez and Martín-Andrade advance cautiously the thesis that the playful execution of an action outside the usual context, or with substitute objects (playing mother with pretend babies such as dolls, stones, etc.), is accompanied by the simultaneous activation of the representation of the usual object, if not even of the usual context (Gómez and Martín-Andrade 2002: 261) . According to the authors, gorillas could even dispose of the representation BI use a stick instead of the usual object^; they would lack the clear concept BI use a stick as if it were the usual object^ (Gómez and Martín-Andrade 2002: 262) , but the representation 'instead of' could be a sort of evolutionary precursor of the 'as if' cognitive structure that support pretence in humans (incidentally said, this discussion could also explain the above described, puzzling 'superstitious' behavior of apes toward biologically neutral objects). In the same way, if an ape hides a fruit to save it from the conspecifics and eats it later on his own, it is difficult to think that the ape has no (more or less precise) inner representation of what would happen if the fruit were not hidden; but, if this is true, this means that the ape is even able to grasp the visual angle of others, to 'take their place'. As for deception, let us consider the classical definition of de Waal: deception is Bthe projection, to one's own advantage, of an inaccurate or false image of knowledge, intentions or motivations^ (de Waal 1992) . This behavioural phenomenon exceeds the perceptive level in many points; it involves, in fact, the representation of normal group behaviour, that of the reaction of the deceived member, that of the obtained advantage, etc. Confronted by all these behavioural phenomena it is very difficult to keep on considering the semiotic abilities of the animal subject as limited to the substitution of perceptive elements through signs. As above remarked, even if we wanted to stick to Langer's idea that animal signs are nothing but proxies, in all these cases we should admit a substitution through proxies of whole social situations, whose elements would be recombined in the mind in various ways. But the mental recombination of semiotically translated perceptive elements is nothing but another form of imagination, or representative ability.
Diffuse Discontinuities in Human and Non-Human Environments
The second strategy that can be used to criticise the hiatus model, which is strictly bound to the thought of Jakob von Uexküll, is based on the idea of diffuse discontinuities. This more radical approach to the human/animal relationship presupposes a deep-ranging shift of focus: from an inquiry on animals and humans as (more or less) advanced cognitive subjects to a phenomenological consideration of the semiotic traits of the different species-specific environments, or Umwelten. The chief aim of this line of criticism is the radical confutation of the (alleged) immediacy of animal experience, whose semiotic side (as we have seen) is the view of signs as mere proxies for perceptive elements or stimuli. And this is a very problematic position, because, on the one side, the mere usage of signs is not enough to give the animal the status of a semiotic subject, and, on the other side, the so-called symbolic mentality gives to human beings a monopoly in the semiotic field. This risks reintroducing between human and non-human animal a sort of quasi-metaphysical difference even if-as we have seen from the beginning-this was precisely what German philosophical anthropology wanted to avoid.
A good way to introduce the approach of the diffuse discontinuities as an alternative to the hiatus model is to discuss how the mentioned authors (Scheler, Gehlen, Plessner, Cassirer, and Langer) interpret the thought of Jakob von Uexküll. With impressive regularity, all of them present as the main Uexküllian concept the strict tie between the effector system (action) and the receptor system (perception) that characterises all animal organisation, but not the human life form. In other words, they make of Uexküll a champion of the hiatus model; like Heidegger (Heidegger 1995: 263-264 )-even if in an anthropological, and not ontological way-they read the notion of Umwelt in opposition to that of Welt (on this point, see also Böhler 1991: 273) . Moreover, the basic coherence between the perceptive and operative side of the animal Umwelt is seen in a mechanistic way, as (again) an immediate reaction to the physical stimuli. By contrast, and always leaning on Uexküll, the world (Welt) of human beings is seen as open to several possibilities of semiotic elaborations (see Scheler 2009, 27-28; Plessner 1975: 230) .
The direct reading of Uexküll's writings and the interpretation of his work given by Thomas Sebeok (Sebeok 1979 ), von Uexküll (1981 , and many other recent scholars (Hoffmeyer 1996; Kull 1998 Kull , 2001 Kull , 2010 Deely 2004; Rüting 2004; Barbieri 2007; Magnus 2008; Tønnessen 2009 Tønnessen , 2014 Tønnessen , 2016 Favareau 2010; Petrilli and Ponzio 2002; Farina and Pieretti 2014; Salthe 2014; Kleisner 2015; Maran 2016) tell us another story. In Uexküll's thought, the constitution of the Umwelt is a transcendental process through which the animal organism transforms the stimuli impinging from the outer reality in perceptive and operative signs (on the validity of this interpretation of the Umwelt concept for all levels of animal life see Brentari 2015: 89-95, 107-115) ; the interaction of both kinds of signs does not at all follow a mechanical immediacy, but is, instead, a sort of subject-mediated tuning of action and perception. The Merkwelt, the perceptive part of the Umwelt, has a semiotic nature, and this from its very physiological origins:
all the receptor organs have the same task: to turn into excitation stimuli from the external world. In other words, in the nervous system it is not the stimulus itself that sets forth, but, instead, there appears a completely different process, which has nothing to do with environmental events. This has to be read as a sign that a stimulus is present in the environment and that it has encountered a receptor. […] . Stimuli from the external world are globally translated as a nervous sign language [in eine nervöse Zeichensprache]. (von Uexküll 1909: 166) Even the reflex arc, which is often the hidden prototype of mechanistic theories of animal life form, is seen by Uexküll as a semiotic and subjective process (von Uexküll 2010: 46, 50) . This basic, physiological semiotisation of perception would be enough to refute the idea, functional to the hiatus model, that the Uexküllian Umwelt-formation is a mechanical process, whereas only the human world would arise from semiotic activity.
Moreover, in addition to the already mentioned, basic constitution of the perceptive and operative Umwelt there is, according to Uexküll, a second and higher level of semiotic elaboration of reality. In other words, in many animal species there is a further elaboration of the perceptive signs. Commenting the series of the lower Umwelten sketched in the first chapters of A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, Uexküll writes: Until now, environments had been the product of the perceptive signs that were awakened by external stimuli. But the search image, the tracing of the most familiar path, and the demarcation of the territory already constitute exceptions to this rule, since they could be ascribed to no sort of external stimuli but represented free productions of the subject. These subjective productions had developed in connection to repeated personal experience of the subject. (von Uexküll 2010: 119) The mentioned phenomena of the behaviour of higher animals-not only territoriality, the tracing of familiar paths, but also imprinting and companionship in social birds-are read by Uexküll as an individual, free resemiotisation of perceptive elements. If at the first level, the physiologic one, the organism acts as a translator of external stimuli in semiotic elements, at the second level it operates in a condition of independence from the external stimuli (the chief example is here the starling catching an imaginary fly, a case study that Uexküll knows thank to a communication by Konrad Lorenz; see von Uexküll 2010: 120-121; Lorenz 1931: 93) . But similar phenomena also occur with domestication: some elements of the Umwelt of a dog acquire a surplus of meaning because of the superposition of the meaning they have for humans Sarris 1931, 1932; von Uexküll 2010: 100; Magnus 2014 Magnus , 2016 .
In Uexküll's theory, the relationship between the two levels of semiotic elaboration of reality can be envisioned through the notion of discontinuity. When a perceptive element that is already charged with meaning undergoes a resemiotisation (when, for example, a social partner becomes a sexual partner) there is a discontinuity between that element and the others of the set to which it had hitherto belonged. For Uexküll, such semiotic discontinuities spontaneously appear in the Umwelt of the different species. If it is true that they appear more frequently in the Umwelt of the so-called 'higher animals' (a concept, however, that Uexküll leaves quite undetermined), it is also true that isolated semiotic discontinuities can also appear in the environment of insects, amphibians, reptiles. It is the case of the Umwelt of the dragonfly, where a particular branch can assume a new tonality, the Bsitting tone^: BWhen a dragonfly flies toward a branch in order to alight upon it, the branch is not just present in the dragonfly's environment as a perceptive image but is also distinguished by a sitting tone^ (von Uexküll 2010: 96) ; this phenomenological trait sorts the branch out from among the semiotic set of the other branches (which can be charged, for instance, with an 'obstacle tone').
This relevant shift in Uexküll's approach-from the semantic faculties of the subjects, to the semantic-phenomenological traits of the environment-is particularly evident in the analysis that the Estonian-German biologist dedicates to the semiotic variability of the human environments. From a reading of von Uexküll (2010) , it is clearly apparent that the author treats the intraspecific semiotic variability demonstrated by the human species as a special case of the general, interspecific semiotic variability. This is evident in the well-known example of the semiotic variability of the oak: this environmental element is described first in relation to different animal species (the meaning of the oak for the squirrel, the fox, etc.) and then, without solution of continuity, in relation to different human subjects (the oak for an old forester, for a little girl, for a painter) (von Uexküll 2010: 128; von Uexküll 1928: 232) .
That means that, in Uexküll's thought, the higher variability of human environments is, indeed, a semiotic discontinuity, but not the discontinuity par excellence, nor the clue of an alleged Wesensunterschied or Sonderstellung of human animals. In other words, in Uexküll's view, semiotic discontinuities are a normal environmental phenomenon, and the lines they draw inside the animal domain are neither hierarchically ranked, nor culminating in humans. Simple phenomena of further resemiotisation of Umwelt elements (the assumption of a new tone by an object) can emerge in the Umwelt of a sea urchin or in that of a squirrel; even more complex phenomena, such as the search image, can transversally connect the Umwelten of a dragonfly, a toad, a dog, and a human looking for a water jug on the table (von Uexküll 2010: 113-118) . And one should not forget that the condition of possibility of such second-level phenomena is the basic semiotic nature of all environments, arising as they do from the transformation of excitations in signs.
Concluding Remarks
After having sketched the hiatus model of German philosophical anthropology in its behavioural, cognitive and semiotic aspects, this paper contrasted it with Uexküll's environmental theory (considered from the point of view of the diffuse discontinuities). To this end, it was necessary to clarify a historical-philosophical misunderstandingdue both to the authors of German philosophical anthropology, and to Heideggeraccording to which Uexküll himself would have been a theoretician of the hiatus and, more precisely, would have clearly separated a mechanical animal Umwelt from the more open and plastic human Welt. Besides its intrinsic interest, the importance of this clarification is due to the fact the hiatus model is still well-represented in many contemporary branches of human-animal studies. It is well alive, for instance, in the theory of culture of Kevin Laland (Laland 2017: 178-179) and in recent information theories on animal communication-see those of Fred Adams and Steve Beighley, who base theirs on the notion of Bnatural signs^(signs that only indicate and do not have meaning) and on the idea of the stimulus-dependence of animal cognition (Adams and Beighley 2013: 400; they refer to Grice 1957) . Even if these authors do not use the term 'hiatus', they stress repeatedly the Bjump from the level of information (indication) to genuine meaning^ (Adams and Beighley 2013: 402) . Another example of the survival of the hiatus model is provided by primatology; according to Adam See (See 2014) , only in humans and apes do we find a relative Bcircumstantial flexibility^, i.e. mediateness and context independence of cognition and communicative action, whereas in all other animals Bcommunicative acts are inextricably bound up with emotions, context, and environmental cues^ (See 2014: 196) . Once again, the threshold between the higher and the lower is only moved downwards, but remains unchanged in its terms.
Behind many of these studies is well recognisable-explicitly or implicitly, and among several other possible roots-the influence of twentieth-century German philosophical anthropology and of its Anglo-Saxon prosecutors (notably Langer). The difference between human and animal is thought of as a natural, but qualitative novelty. Here we find, again, the positive historical role of the philosophical anthropology in overcoming idealism and the belief in some sort of ontological privilege of humans. At the same time, it is taken for granted that such natural-qualitative novelty is unique in the realm of the living, that with humans there is the hiatus, the discontinuity par excellence. This permanent stiffness of the human-animal relationship-a kind of reproduction, in the form of a semiotic or cognitive discontinuity, of the ancient ontological privilege of humans-is what we wanted to criticise. In doing that, one has to be well aware of the risk of an abrupt abolition of the hiatus model, i.e., to go back to the mechanic model of the gradual enhancement of faculties that remain unchanged in themselves (intelligence, insight, etc.) . Nevertheless, this risk should not prevent us from using Uexküll's environmental theory and the possibility it offers to move from the hiatus model to the approach of the diffuse discontinuities. The emergence of qualitative differences has to be seen as a relatively common phenomenon in the realm of animal life and experience: they are neither 'ontological', nor 'essential', nor ever exit the field of organic life. The Uexküllian view of diffuse discontinuities emerging in a rather fluid environmental context strengthens the conviction of many cognitive scientists that Bit is perfectly possible to be very complex cognitively without dealing with knowledge in the particular way we do^ (Tattersall 2014: 220) .
